《经济学人》：脆弱政权的下一个皇上(图)

2010-10-25 10:46 作者:张东光编译

《经济学人》：脆弱政权的下一个皇上 The next emperor (中英文)
（图说：法新社报导，习近平之能够脱颖而出，是因为他的派系色彩并不浓厚，可获其他各路人马的接受。从而否定了日前网上流传的“习属江系”之说。）

毛泽东曾对他的继承人华国锋说:“让你负责，我放心。”但最后证实这是个灾难性的选择。华国锋在 1978年下台前还风光了两三年。十年后，接班的问题又在民主运动的背景下荒唐上演。八年前，胡锦涛继位。现在，接班的问题又浮上台面。全球应该对此感到紧张，原因之一是不清楚中共下一位领导人的性格，其二是中共的政权远比外界想像的还要脆弱。

据《经济学人》21日报导，10月18日在胡锦涛的授意下，中共国家副主席习近平晋升中共中央军委副主席。这是一个王储的位置。57岁的习近平是中共已故元老、前全国人大副委员长习仲勋的儿子，近几年外界才开始熟悉他。

习近平如何爬到这个位置，对于外界来说仍然很神秘。他被指定接班很像北韩的金正恩，金也是在北韩共党的闭门密会后被授予军委副主席的头衔，对外无公开的说明。中共则是在4,600个枯燥乏味的五中全会公报的文字中提及此事。

往好的一面说，习近名曾经担任过福建、浙江与上海等沿海经济重镇的领导，他比较有国际观，他的妻子是知名歌星。但这些都不足以说明他能担当军国大任。另一方面，他的父亲曾在文化大革命中被诬陷、关押16年，后被平反。但对于中共的权力核心来说，习近平是个新手，他比2002年刚接班时的胡锦涛还要资浅。中共内部有许多人反对习等太子党的掌权。未来两年的接班过渡期将是考验。

同样，让外界感到不安的，不是这个军委副主席的职位有多重要，而是习近平的默默无闻。从近期中共对外的宣称显示，中共的领导阶层对于经济与政改的优先次序意见分歧。

根据中共政府数据，中国的经济快速增长，但它却必须面临过度投资、过度倚赖出口的痛苦调整。五中全会的公报中还揭橥了新的五年经济计划纲领，要求维持增长的步调、薪资阶级占全国所得的比例提高。这对中国和全球都是好事，将有助于缩减中美间的贸易顺差。出口企业担心，如果工资或人民币增值过快，企业将受伤害。习惯使用廉价信贷、土地与能源的国营企业，也将抵制这些特权被剥夺的威胁。

就政改而言，中共领导人过去30年来都谈到民主，但做的很少。网络与手机的快速增长与普及，让中国民众比以前更能互相沟通、纾解愤怒、自由地追求梦想，当然也可以攻击中共当局，现在有些民众还要求更多治国方面的言论自由。

过去几周，许多较为开放的国内媒体都在热情洋溢地谈论温家宝所说的“政改”，但保守的媒体则一直严厉审查这些言论。要让谨慎的胡锦涛在下台前进行大幅的改革几乎不可能。五中全会公报还在赞扬中共社会主义体系的政治优势，仅简短地提到政改，说它需要积极但稳妥的努力。

习近平会加速政改吗？外界感到怀疑，因为认为要谨慎处理的中共保守派大有人在。但从实务面来看，脱离共党控制的努力若失败，中国经济的发展将受波及。民众不满的爆发，加上中共当局对一般民众麻木不仁导致的忿恨，目前正在全国的乡镇与都市中不断增温。据中共官方资料显示，1993年以来，每四年大规模的群体抗议与暴动超过90,000起。过去，中共领导人依赖经济的增长来维持稳定。一旦经济突然暴落，群众将怨声载道。

习近平要走的正确道路很清楚：放松共党对群众不满的控制、揭开神秘的面纱、进行重大的经济改革。不过，外界对此并不乐观。中共在感到政权不稳固时，惯于诉诸民族主义，中共五中全会期间爆发的反日抗议就是明证。

许多西方人士，就连那些主张对于人民币低估采取贸易制裁的人士都认为，他们的对手是一个自信、理性的成熟政权。这一点他们错了。这就好像一个偏执、封闭的专制法庭，处理案件已经应不暇给了，现在还要稍微退一步考虑尴尬的交接问题，中共目前的处境也是如此。

 

The next emperor

A crown prince is anointed in a vast kingdom facing vaster stresses. China is in a fragile state Oct 21st 2010

“WITH you in charge, I am at ease,” Mao Zedong is supposed to have told his successor, Hua Guofeng. It proved a disastrous choice. Mr Hua lasted a couple of years before being toppled in 1978. A decade later succession plans once again unravelled spectacularly, against a backdrop of pro-democracy unrest. Only once, eight years ago, has China’s Communist Party managed a smooth transfer of power—to Hu Jintao. Now a new transition is under way. The world should be nervous about it for two reasons: the unknown character of China’s next leader; and the brittle nature of a regime that is far less monolithic and assured than many foreigners assume.

The man ordained to take over Mr Hu’s twin roles as party chief in 2012 and president the following year is hardly a household name. On October 18th Vice-President Xi Jinping was given a new job as vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, which Mr Hu heads. This is a position for leaders-in-waiting. The portly son of one of Communist China’s founders, little known to the outside world until a few years ago, Mr Xi is preparing to take the helm of a country with the world’s second-biggest economy and its biggest armed forces—and which is in the midst of wrenching social change.

Quite how he has risen so high in a party that, for all its growing engagement with the world, remains deeply secretive, is unclear. Mr Xi’s appointment was eerily similar to the recent anointing of Kim Jong Un in North Korea: he too was made vice-chairman of a military commission after a closed-door party conclave, without public explanation. China’s leaders at least offered a sentence on Mr Xi’s appointment, albeit at the end of an arid 4,600-character communiqué after the fifth party congress (see article).

On the positive side, Mr Xi has held some big posts in the most economically dynamic and globally integrated parts of the country: the coastal provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang as well as, briefly, Shanghai. He is a relatively cosmopolitan figure. His wife is a popular singer.

But it is impossible to assess how well qualified he is to run the country or how assured his succession is. On the face of it, one engineer whose father was denounced during the Cultural Revolution is handing over to another. But Mr Xi is a relative newcomer to the inner circle; he has not served as long as Mr Hu had in 2002. There are plenty in the party who resent the rise to power of well-connected “princelings” like Mr Xi. A two-year transition will be a test.

All this one day will be yours

All the same, it is the immensity of the task, not the obscurity of the man, that should make the world nervous. For all their outward expressions of unity, there are signs of disagreement among Chinese leaders over what the country’s priorities should be—both on the economy and on political reform.

The economy is sprinting along by Western standards, but China faces a hard adjustment to wean itself off excessive investment and exports in favour of more reliance on consumption. The communiqué unveiled guidelines for a new five-year economic plan (see article). This calls for a more sustainable pace of growth, with wage-earners getting a bigger share of the national income. This would be good for China and the world, helping to narrow the trade surplus that annoys America so much. But the change will not be painless. Exporters fear business will suffer if wages soar or the yuan rises fast. Powerful state-owned enterprises, used to cheap credit, land and energy, will resist threats to these privileges.

As for political reform, Chinese leaders have talked about democracy for the past 30 years, but done little. Rapid growth and the spread of the internet and mobile phones have enabled Chinese citizens to communicate, vent their grievances and pursue their dreams more freely than before, so long as they do not attack the party. But some are now demanding more say in how the country is run. In the past few weeks China’s more liberal newspapers have enthused about calls by the prime minister, Wen Jiabao, for “political reform”. Conservative newspapers have censored them.

There is next to no chance of the cautious Mr Hu bringing in big reforms before he steps down. This week’s communiqué hailed the “political advantages of China’s socialist system” and mentioned political reform only briefly, saying—as Chinese leaders so often do—that it will require “vigorous yet steady” effort. Even Mr Wen, who will step down at the same time as Mr Hu, has wanted to move at glacial speed.

Expect paranoia and you may be pleasantly surprised

Might Mr Xi speed things up? There is no shortage of conservatives arguing for caution, but there is also a pragmatic argument for change: China’s economic gains could be jeopardised by a failure to loosen the party’s hold. Explosions of public discontent, fuelled by resentment of government callousness towards ordinary citizens, are becoming increasingly common in villages, towns and cities across the country.

The (admittedly patchy) official data show a more than tenfold increase in the annual number of large protests and disturbances since 1993, with more than 90,000 cases reported in each of the past four years. In the past China’s leaders have relied on growth to secure social stability. If and when a more serious slowdown strikes, popular grumbles could increase.

The right path for Mr Xi should be clear: relax the party’s grip on dissent, lift its shroud of secrecy and make vital economic reforms. But the rest of the world would be unwise to assume that reason will prevail. In times of uncertainty, the regime is wont to appeal to nationalist sentiment. Large anti-Japanese protests erupted during the latest party meeting. America and the West have also been subjected to tongue-lashings. The party meeting called on officials to strengthen “the country’s comprehensive national power”.

Too many Westerners, including those urging trade sanctions over the yuan, assume that they are dealing with a self-confident, rational power that has come of age. Think instead of a paranoid, introspective imperial court, already struggling to keep up with its subjects and now embarking on a slightly awkward succession—and you may be less disappointed.